

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ACDE-00 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

USIE-00 ERDE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /083 W  
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TO SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 3921  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5481

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR  
SUBJECT: MBFR: OPTION III: OBTAINING FIANL ALLIED AGREEMENT

SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE REVIEWS PRESENT STATE OF SPC WORK ON  
OPTION III, AND MAKES RECOMMENDATIONS TOWARD OBTAINING ALLIED  
AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY

1. THE SPC DRAFT GUIDANCE AND POSITION PAPER ON OPTION III ARE  
NOW LARGELY UNBRACKETED. NEVERTHELESS, SOME OF THE REMAINNG  
BRACKETS REPRESENT DIFFICULT ISSUES, WHICH WILL REQUIRE DECISIONS  
IN CAPITALS BEFORE FINAL ALLIED AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. THE  
MORE IMPORTANT OF THESE ISSUES ARE "APPROPRIATE DEFINITION" OF THE  
COMMON CEILING; CEILINGS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AND  
US TANKS; AIR MANPOWER; AND FURTHER EQUIPMENT REDUCTIONS.

COMMON CEILING  
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2. SPC DISCUSSION OF "APPROPRIATE DEFINITION" OF THE COMMON  
CEILING WAS PUT ASIDE FOR SEVERAL MEETINGS, PENDING THE OUTCOME  
OF UK REVIEW ON THIS ISSUE. THE NEW UK POSITION SIMPLY ADDS  
THE REQUIREMENT OF AGREEMENT ON PHASE I ON DATA ON THE STARTING  
POINTS TO THE PREVIOUS UK REQUIREMENT OF PHASE I AGREEMENT ON

A NUMERICAL COMMON CEILING. THE EUROPEAN ALLIES CONTINUE TO WISH TO USE OPTION III FOR MORE THAN THE PRESENT PHASE I OBJECTIVES, IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THE FRAMEWORK FOR THEIR OWN REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II. HOWEVER, THEY STILL DO NOT AGREE AMONG THEMSELVES ON EXACTLY HOW TO USE OPTION III TOWARD THIS END.

3. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE US ARGUMENT WHICH APPEARS TO MAKE THE MOST IMPRESSION ON THE EUROPEANS IS THAT IT IS TECHNICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ALLIES TO COME UP WITH A NUMBER AT THIS TIME TO PROPOSE TO THE EAST AS THE NUMERICAL COMMON CEILING, AND THAT ONCE THE ALLIES HAVE INTRODUCED OPTION III IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO "UP THE ANTE" BY IMPOSING NEW REQUIREMENTS ON THE OTHER SIDE. HOWEVER, THE EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE GENERALLY NOT RECEPTIVE TO OTHER ARGUMENTS RAISED BY THE US. EXCEPT FOR DENMARK, THEY BELIEVE THE IMPORTANCE OF OPTIN III JUSTIFIES RAISING THE PHASE I REQUIREMENTS OF THE OTHER SIDE. THE EUROPEANS WOULD GENERALLY NOT MIND PREMATURELY RAISING PHASE II ISSUES, INORDER TO USE OPTION III TO HELP SET THE NUMERICAL OUTCOME OF PHASE II.

4. FRG DELEGATION OFFICER HOYNCK HAS TOLD US THAT INITIAL FRG REACTION TO THE UK PROPOSAL IS TO REGARD EVEN MORE THE FRG APPROACH AS THE INTERMEDIATE ONE. BONN CONTINUES TO WISH TO GIVE AHG FLEXIBILITY TO SEEK EASTERN AGREEMENT IN PHASE I ON EITHER POST PHASE I DATA (TO ESTABLISH THE ASYMMETRIES) OR A NUMERICAL COMMON CEILING, BUT NOT BOTH. BONNS FIRST REACTION IS THAT UK PROPOSAL WOULD LEAVE NOTHING LEFT TO NEGOTIATE IN PHASE II. FRG INTENDS TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT POSITION, ALTHOUGH IT IS FLEXIBLE RE LANGUAGE.

5. WE BELIEVE THE US SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT POSITION ON THE COMMON CEILING FOR THE NEXT FEW SPC MEETINGS, AND SEE HOW THE OTHER ALLIES GRAPPLE WITH THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO MAKE AN INITIAL PRESENTATION TO THE EAST WITHOUT A SPECIFIC NUMBER AND THEN LATER PROPOSE A SPECIFIC NUMBER AS A NEW REQUIREMENT.

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HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO US HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT IN THE END THE ALLIES WILL AGREE TO AN OPTION III WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE EAST AGREE TO ONLY THE "CONCEPT" OF THE COMMON CEILING. WE BELIEVE THE US SHOULD CONSIDER SOME VARIANT FO THE FRG APPROACH WHICH WOULD GIVE AHG THE FLEXIBLUITY TO PROBE THE EAST ON A NUMBER OF WAYS OF SETTING THE STAGE FOR PHASE II, WITHOUT SETTING AS AN ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A SPECIFIC NUMERICAL COMMONCEILING.

CEILINGS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AND US TANKS

6. THE FRG IS THE ONLY ALLY NOT TO ACCEPT LIMIITS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AND US TANKS "IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT". FRG CONSIDERS THIS PHRASE DANGEROUSLY VAGUE. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE TWO ALTERNATIVES

FOR THE US ARE EITHER TO SEEK INTERNAL ALLIED AGREEMENT ON EXACTLY WHAT THIS PHRASE MEANS, OR TO PROPOSE DELETION OF LIMITS ON THESE RECIPROCAL ELEMENTS FROM THE ALLIED POSITION. ANY INTERMEDIARY COURSE, WHICH APPEARED TO LEAD TOWARD A LIMIT ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, AND THEREFORE ON US TANKS (FRG RECOGNIZES THE LINK) WITHOUT CLEAR ALLIED UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THESE LIMITS WOULD BE, WOULD PROBABLY ENCOUNTER THE SAME RESISTANCE FROM FRG AS DID THE PHRASE "IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT".

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3922

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7. WE BELIEVE THE ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY THE DELETION OF LIMITS ON RECIPROCAL ELEMENTS FROM THE ALLIED POSITION. THE US WOULD NEED TO PRESENT SUCH A PROPOSAL, WITH WELL DEVELOPED EXPLANATION THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID A LIMIT ON US TANKS, AND THIS WAS THE ONLY WAY TO BE SURE OF AVOIDING SUCH A LIMIT. ALLIES APPEAR TO RECOGNIZE THAT ABSENCE OF FIRM US TANK LIMIT IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN LIMIT ON SOVIET NUCLEARS. THE EUROPEANS WOULD OF COURSE SEE THAT ELIMINATION OF A LIMIT ON US TANKS WOULD OBLIGE THE POSSIBILITY THAT SUCH A LIMIT WOULD LEAD TO A LIMIT ON NON-US ALLIED TANKS.

AIR MANPOWER

8. WE HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY SPC DISCUSSION OF AIRMANPOWER AT LAST FEW MEETINGS. WE ARE NOW CONVINCED THAT THE ALLIES ARE CAPABLE OF EARLY INTERNAL AGREEMENT ON AN APPROACH

TO SERVICE SUB CEILINGS, AND THEREFORE THAT THE ALLIES WILL  
BE ABLE TO OFFER INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON  
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CEILING AT THE SAME TIME AS OPTION III.

9. THE FRG HAS REAFFIRMED THE POSITION IN ITS JANUARY 16 PAPER, CALLING FOR INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING, AND FOR EQUAL, EXPLICIT SUBCEILINGS ON GROUND FORCES. HOWEVER, THE FRG REVIEW CONTINUES, AND AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, FRG IS LEANING TOWARD INCLUDING A SMALL FLEXIBILITY MARGIN FOR RESTRUCTURING. BELGIAN REP AT OCTOBER 6 OSPC MEETING SAID THAT IF AIR MANPOWER WERE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE COMMON CEILING, APPROXIMATE PARITY I GROUND FORCES WOULD REQUIRE AN EXPLICIT SUB CEILING ON GROUND FORCES, AND HE SUPPORTED A NUMERICAL FLEXIBILITY MARGIN OF 20,000. UK HAS SUPPORTED US PROPOSAL OF NON EXPLICIT SUB CEILINGS, BUT ALSO PREFERS A NUMEICAL FLEXIBILITY MARGIN, E G 20,000. NO ALLY SUPPORTS THE US PROPOSAL OF A FLEXIBILITY MARGIN OF TEN PERCENT OF AIR MANPOWER.

10. WE DOUBT THAT ANY OTHER ALLY WILL TAKE A STRONG POSITION ON THIS PARTICULAR SUBJECT. THE WAY TO CONSENSUS APPEARS TO US TO BE THE FRG/BELGIAN IDEA OF A COMMON SUBCEILING ON GROUND FORCES, WITH A FLEXIBILIBIY MARGIN FOR RESTRUCTURING. THE VIEWS OF FRG AND BELGIUM, AS ALLIES LOCATED WITHIN NGA, HAVE MORE WEIGHT IN SPC ON THIS ISSUE THAN THE VIEW OF THE UK. IN ADDITION, THIS COURSE MIGHT HELP LEAD BELGIUM TO SUPPORT INCLUSIONOF AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING. SINCE NO ALLY SUPPORTS TEN PERCENT OF AR MANPOWER AS THEFLEXIBILITY MARGIN, AND SINCE UK AND BELGIUM HAVE BOTH SUPPORTED A NUMERICLA MARGIN OF ABOUT 20,000, THE FIGURE IN WHICH THE WORKING GROUP REPORT SAW ADVANTAGES, THIS FIGURE WOULD SEEM TO OFFER THE BASIS FOR ALLIED CONSENSUS. (WE WOULD ASSUME THAT ANY FLEXIBILITY MARGIN TO COME OUT OF THE PRESENT FRG REVIEW WOULDNOT BE LARGER,AND COULD BE SMALLER THAN THIS FIGURE). WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT THE US NOW SUPPORT AN INTERNAL ALLIED DECISION FOR A COMMON SUB CEILING ON GROUND FORCES, THE EXACT LEVEL TO BE SPECIFIED AT A LATER DATE, WTH A FLEXIBILITY MARGIN OF 20,000 (THE SIZE OF THE FLEXIBILITY MARGIN FOR US AND SOVIET SUB CEILINGS AND FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN PHASES COULD BE DECIDED LATER).

FURTHER EQUIPEMET REDUCTIONS

11. THE US AND FRG HAVE HAD NOTHING TO SAY IN THE SPC IN RECENT WEEKS ON THE QUESION OF FURTHER EQUIPMENT REDUCTION,  
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REPRESENTED IN PARA 3 OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE AND PARA 3 (BIS) OF THE DRAFT POSITION PAPER. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CONCLUDE THE US FRG DISCUSSIONS ON THIS POINT SO THAT

SERIOUS SPC DISCUSSION OF IT MAY RESUME. AS WE UNDERSTNAD IT, RUTH STILL OWES THE US A REPLY ON THE AST US TEXT. IN ADDITION, FRG STILL OWES THE US AN ANSWER ON WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A SEPARATE TACTICE PAPER. SINCE THE US DEMARCHE TO FRG, OTHER ALLIES (UK ITALY BLEGIUM) HAVE VOICED THE NEED FOR TACTICS PAPER. IF THERE IS TO BE ONE, THE US SHOULD SUBMIT IT IN SPC AT AN EARLY DATE.

TIMING

12. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT AT SOME POINT IT WILL BE USEFUL TACTICS FOR MISSION TO PROPOSE IN SPC A TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETION OF WORK ON GUIDANCE TO AHG ON OPTION IP I. WE HAVE FOUND TARGET DATES TO BE USEFUL TACTICAL DEVICE FOR SPURRING NATO THE FINAL DISTANCE TO AGREEMENT ON A PARTICULAR SUBJECT. HOWEVER A TARGET DATE, TO SERVE ITS PURPOSE, MUST BE SEEN BY THE ALLIES TO BE REALISTIC, OR THEY WILL EITHER NOT ACCEPT IT OR NOT TAKE IT SERIOUSLY. UNTIL THERE IS SOME FURTHER PROGRESS ON ISSUES DESCRIBED ABOVE, THEREFORE, WE DO NOT THINK IT ADVISABLE TO PROPOSE A TARGET DATE. US PROPOSAL OF AN UNREALISTIC DEADLINE WOULD ONLY CREATE THE IMPRESSION AMONG THE ALLIES OF UNDUE US HASTE, WHICH WOULD LEAD OTHER ALLIES TO DIG IN ON LANGUAGE IN THE GUIDANCE WHICH THE US OPPOSES. STREATROR

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